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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Matthew Larry Pridgen appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon 
his guilty plea to first-degree stalking. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A no-contact order prohibiting Pridgen from having contact with Carrie 
Williams was entered pursuant to Pridgen's charge and conviction for domestic 
battery. (Confidential exhibits, pp.16, 23. 1) In April 2013, in violation of that order, 
Pridgen wrote a letter to Williams. (Confidential exhibits, pp.16-17.) In May 2013, 
Pridgen called Williams from a pay phone. (Confidential exhibits, p.14.) In June 
2013, a neighbor who was aware of the no-contact order called the police after she 
observed Pridgen entering Williams' residence. (R., pp.14-15.) Before police could 
arrive, Pridgen crawled into Williams' bed, put his arm around her neck, and pulled 
her towards him. (R., p.16.) Pridgen told Williams that he did not care about the no-
contact order and that he just wanted to be with her. (Id.) Williams told Pridgen that 
he needed to leave. (Id.) Pridgen began to take off Williams' pants before Williams 
squirmed away. (Id.) Soon after, an officer arrived at the residence and arrested 
Pridgen. (R., pp.14-15.) 
The state filed a complaint charging Pridgen with felony stalking, burglary, and 
attempted rape. (R., pp.20-21.) The magistrate court dismissed these charges at 
1 The PSI, motions and orders relating to the competency evaluation, and the 
competency evaluation itself, are contained within the electronic file, "MATTHEW 
LARRY PRIDGEN CR13-1855 CONFIDENTIAL.pdf." Citations to page numbers of 
the "Confidential exhibits" refer to the page numbers of this file. 
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the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, and instead, with the consent of the state, 
bound Pridgen over to the district court on a charge of battery with the intent to 
commit a serious felony. (R., p.42; Prelim Tr., p.63, L.6 - p.69, L.9.) In a second 
amended information, the state charged Pridgen with felony battery with intent to 
commit a serious felony, misdemeanor unlawful entry, and two counts of 
misdemeanor violation of a no-contact order. (R., pp.84-86.) 
While the case was pending, Pridgen's attorney filed a motion requesting that 
the district court order an evaluation to assess Pridgen's competence to stand trial. 
(R., pp.87-88; Confidential exhibits, p.1.) The district court granted the motion. 
(Confidential exhibits pp.2-3.) However, Pridgen refused to fully participate in the 
evaluation, and the evaluator was unable to form an opinion with regard to Pridgen's 
competency. (Confidential exhibits pp.8-11.) At a subsequent hearing, Pridgen 
agreed to participate in a second evaluation on the ground that it would be limited to 
the relevant competency questions - whether he understood the nature of the 
proceedings against him and whether he was able to assist in his own defense. 
(3/31/14 Tr., p.23, Ls.6-15; p.25, L.12-p.26, L.16.) However, Pridgen's counsel 
later informed the court that the evaluator refused to do a "piecemeal" evaluation. 
(5/12/14 Tr., p.19, L.20 - p.20, L.4.) The case remained scheduled for trial. 
Shortly before trial, the state and Pridgen entered into a plea agreement, 
pursuant to which Pridgen pied guilty to an amended charge of felony stalking, and 
the state agreed to dismiss the three misdemeanor charges. (6/3/14 Tr., p.5, L.6 -
p.6, L.24; R., p.150.) The state agreed to recommend probation if Pridgen was 
accepted into mental health court. (6/3/14 Tr., p.5, L.6 - p.6, L.24; R., p.150.) The 
2 
state filed an amended information which contained the felony stalking charge. (R., 
pp.151-152.) Prior to sentencing, Pridgen moved to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., 
pp.178-179.) After a hearing, the district court denied the motion. (R., pp.191 92; 
see generally 8/13/14 Tr.) 
The district court imposed a unified four and one-half year sentence with two 
and one-half years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.206-208.) Pridgen timely 
appealed. (R., pp.209-212.) At the conclusion of the period of retained jurisdiction, 
the district court suspended the previously-imposed sentence and placed Pridgen on 




Pridgen states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by abandoning its order 
for a competency evaluation after finding reason to doubt Mr. 
Pridgen's competence? 
2. Is Mr. Pridgen's guilty plea void because the district court had no 
jurisdiction over the improperly-amended third Information 
charging Mr. Pridgen with first degree stalking? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. 
Pridgen's motion to withdraw his guilty plea because Mr. 
Pridgen had just reasons to withdraw the plea? 
(Appellant's brief, p.12) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Pridgen failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion 
with respect to its determinations regarding Pridgen's competency to enter a 
guilty plea? 
2. Has Pridgen failed to demonstrate that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
accept his guilty plea to first-degree stalking? 
3. Has Pridgen failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion 




Pridgen Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
With Respect To Its Determinations Regarding Pridgen's Competency To Enter A 
Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
Pridgen contends that the district court abused its discretion by not sua 
sponte continuing to attempt to assess Pridgen's competency after Pridgen's 
counsel withdrew his request for the court to do so. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-16.) 
Pridgen has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion under 
the relevant law. 
B. Standard of Review 
The decision whether to order a psychological evaluation to determine a 
defendant's competence to stand trial is ordinarily reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Hanson, 152 Idaho 314, 325, 271 P.3d 712, 723 (2012). Unless 
the district court's finding is clearly erroneous, the appellate court will affirm a district 
court's determinations regarding a defendant's competency. State v. Hawkins, 148 
Idaho 774, 777, 229 P.3d 379, 382 (Ct. App. 2009). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion With Respect To Its 
Determinations Regarding Pridgen's Competency 
Idaho Code§ 18-210 provides: 
No person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to 
understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense 
shall be tried, convicted, sentenced or punished for the commission of an 
offense so long as such incapacity endures. 
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If there is a reason to doubt a defendant's competency, the "must 
order a 'qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and report upon 
the mental condition of the defendant to assist counsel with defense or understand 
the proceedings."' Hanson, 152 Idaho at 325, 271 P.3d at 723 (quoting I.C. § 18-
211 (1)). The test for determining a defendant's competence to stand trial or to enter 
a guilty plea is whether he "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational, 
as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him." kt (citations and 
quotations omitted). 
"There are 'no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for 
further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed."' kt (quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 
U.S. 162, 180 (1975)). Although a defendant's attorney's input on the need for a 
competency evaluation is relevant, it "certainly is not determinative." kt (citations 
and quotations omitted). 
Idaho Code § 18-211 (6) provides that "[i)f the examination cannot be 
conducted by reason of the unwillingness of the defendant to participate therein, the 
report shall so state and shall include, if possible, an opinion as to whether such 
unwillingness of the defendant was the result of mental disease or defect." The 
statute does not assign any particular duty to the district court in the event that an 
evaluator is precluded from making a competency determination on a defendant who 
is unwilling to participate in the examination. 
In this case, Pridgen's counsel filed a motion requesting that the district court 
order an evaluation to assess whether Pridgen was competent to stand trial. (R., 
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pp.87-88; Confidential exhibits, p.1.) The motion asserted that there was "reason to 
believe that the Defendant lack[ed] the capacity to understand the proceedings 
against him and may be unable to assist in his own defense," but did not provide any 
specific information to support this assertion. (Confidential exhibits, p.1.) The 
district court did not expressly find that there was reason to believe that Pridgen 
lacked competency to stand trial, but it granted the motion and ordered the 
evaluation. (Confidential exhibits, pp.2-3.) 
Pridgen was "marginally cooperative" with the competency evaluator. 
(Confidential exhibits, p.11.) Pridgen told the evaluator that he had agreed to 
participate in the evaluation in order to give himself and his attorney more time to 
prepare his defense. (Confidential exhibits, p.10.) The evaluator noted that "[t]here 
was no evidence of disturbances of perceptions or thought which would have been 
suggestive of a psychotic disorder." (Id.) Pridgen told the evaluator that he had 
never been diagnosed with or treated for any mental illness. (Id.) However, the 
evaluator concluded that "[i]t was not possible, within the constraints of this 
evaluation, to determine whether the lack of compliance of this individual was due to 
an inability, an unwillingness, a mental health issue, personality features, 
interpersonal features, oppositional tendencies, or a combination." (Confidential 
exhibits, p.11.) Therefore, the evaluator was "unable to form an opinion regarding 
mental health issues, or to assess [Pridgen's] basic understanding of legal concepts 
and ability to assist in his own defense." (Id.) 
At a subsequent hearing, Pridgen's counsel expressed that he was still 
concerned about Pridgen's competence, and that there were "several pieces of 
7 
evidence" that Pridgen was not permitting him to disclose that would "strongly show 
that he has competency issues." (3/31/14 , p.5, L.13 - p.8, L.24.) Without 
providing specifics, Pridgen's counsel also stated that Pridgen "cannot make 
informed decisions about his defense," and "gets confused and ... very upset." 
(3/31/14 Tr., p.8, Ls.7-18.) Pridgen's counsel proposed that the court either order 
Pridgen to submit to another competency evaluation, or order the involuntary 
hospitalization of Pridgen and require him to undergo treatment. (3/31/14 Tr., p.6, 
L.20 - p.7, L.25.) 
Pridgen then spoke on his own behalf and expressed his concerns about the 
"reliability" of the evaluation, and indicated that the scope of the evaluation was 
broader than he had anticipated. (3/31/14 Tr., p.15, L.18 - p.18, L.8.) Upon further 
discussion between the district court and the parties, the court expressed a 
willingness to enter a new order that would direct the competency evaluator to limit 
its examination and conclusions to the question of Pridgen's capacity to understand 
the proceedings against him, and to assist in his own defense. (3/31/14 Tr., p.18, 
L.9 - p.26, L.5.) Pridgen indicated that he would agree to participate in such an 
evaluation. (3/31/14 Tr., p.26, Ls.7-16; p.30, Ls.3-4.) Pridgen's counsel stated that 
he would prepare an order consistent with the district court's proposal. (3/31/14 Tr., 
p.26, L.17- p.28, L.21.) 
By the time of the next court hearing approximately two months later, Pridgen 
was represented by new counsel. (See generally 5/9/14 Tr.) The district court 
obseNed that Pridgen's prior counsel did not prepare a new order for a competency 
evaluation. (5/9/14 Tr., p.14, L.5 - p.15, L.14.) At the next status conference, 
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Pridgen's counsel informed the court that Pridgen's prior counsel had contacted the 
evaluator, but that the evaluator refused to do a "piecemeal, part here, part there 
type of an evaluation." (5/12/14 Tr., p.19, L.18 - p.20, L.4.) Pridgen's counsel 
further represented that Pridgen's prior counsel had intended to withdraw his motion 
for a competency evaluation. (5/12/14 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-4.) Pridgen's counsel did not 
ask the court to order any additional evaluations, to hold an additional competency 
hearing, or to otherwise further pursue a determination on the question of Pridgen's 
competency. Approximately three weeks later, on the date of the scheduled jury 
trial, Pridgen pied guilty to the amended felony stalking charge. (See generally 
6/3/14 Tr.) 
Pridgen has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion 
under the applicable law. As provided by I.C. § 18-211(1), the court appointed a 
licensed psychologist to evaluate whether Pridgen was competent to stand trial. 
After the evaluator concluded that it could not make a competency determination in 
light of Pridgen's refusal to fully participate, the district court indicated its willingness 
to order a second competency evaluation. At this point, Pridgen's counsel 
essentially withdrew his request for the court to facilitate future attempts to evaluate 
Pridgen's competence. Idaho Code§ 18-211 did not require the district court to take 
any additional actions regarding this issue at this point. 
While a trial judge is "under a continuing duty to observe a defendant's ability 
to understand the proceedings against him," State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 
P.3d 278, 297 (2003), there is no indication in the record that the district court 
violated its duty in this case. Aside from the unspecified concerns expressed by 
g 
Pridgen's counsel (who later withdrew his motion for a competency evaluation), 
there is no indication in the record that Pridgen was incompetent to stand trial or to 
enter a guilty plea. A review of the hearing transcripts reveals that while Pridgen 
was occasionally long-winded and somewhat unfocused, he was able to express 
himself coherently, and demonstrated an understanding of the criminal proceedings 
against him. (See~. 3/31/14 Tr., p.15, L.1 - p.18, L.8; 6/3/14 Tr., p.7, L.14- p.16, 
L.8; 9/16/14 Tr., p.47, L.2- p.55, L.14.) In particular, Pridgen was able to coherently 
explain his concerns that the first competency evaluation exceeded the scope of the 
relevant question of his competence. (3/31/14 Tr., p.15, L.1 - p.18, L.8.) In addition, 
despite an extensive criminal history that includes at thirteen misdemeanor criminal 
convictions, there is no indication in the record that Pridgen was previously declared 
incompetent to stand trial, or that he even had been diagnosed with or treated for 
any particular mental health condition or disorder. (Confidential exhibits, pp.8-11, 
20-26.) 
In light of this absence of evidence that Pridgen might be incompetent to 
stand trial, the district court was not required to sua sponte order additional 
competency evaluations in response to Pridgen's counsel's vague expressed 
concerns, particularly where counsel later essentially retracted those concerns by 
electing not to further pursue the competency issue. Pridgen has therefore failed to 
demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion. 
In a footnote contained in his Appellant's brief, Pridgen also appears to 
contend that Pridgen's conviction violated his constitutional due process rights. 
(Appellant's brief, p.13 n.7 (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375,378 (1966)). The 
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conviction of a legally incompetent person violates due process, and where the 
evidence before the court raises a bona fide doubt about the defendant's 
competency, due process requires that a competency hearing be held. Robinson, 
383 U.S. at 378-385. In this case, as discussed above, the district court conducted 
a competency hearing and ordered a competency evaluation even though Pridgen's 
counsel's expressed concerns about Pridgen's competence were unspecified and 
unsupported. Because the record is otherwise devoid of evidence indicating that 
Pridgen was incompetent to stand trial, the district court was not required to conduct 
additional hearings or order additional evaluations after Pridgen's counsel 
abandoned the competency issue. 
Based upon the evidence before it regarding Pridgen's ability to assist in his 
own defense and to understand the nature of the proceedings against him, the 
district court acted well within its discretion in declining to sua sponte order an 
additional competency evaluation, or to otherwise further pursue the question of 
Pridgen's competency after Pridgen's attorney withdrew his request for the court to 
do so. This Court should therefore affirm Pridgen's conviction. 
11. 
Pridgen Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To 
Accept His Guilty Plea To First-Degree Stalking 
A. Introduction 
Pridgen contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to accept his guilty 
plea to first-degree stalking. (R., pp.16-20.) Specifically, Pridgen contends that the 
stalking charge, which the state included in its third amended information, was not 
subject to a probable cause determination at a preliminary hearing as required by 
11 
state law. (Id.) Pridgen's argument fails because his guilty plea 
waived his right to a preliminary hearing. 
8. Standard of Review 
charge 
Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised at any 
time and is subject to de novo review. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 
699, 701 (2004) (citing Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469,471, 903 P.2d 58, 60 (1995), 
and State v. Barros, 131 Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1998)). 
C. The District Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction To Accept Pridgen's Guilty 
Plea To Felony Stalking 
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general 
type or class of dispute." Idaho courts have "subject matter jurisdiction over a crime 
if any essential element of the crime, including the result, occurs within Idaho." State 
v. Doyle, 121 Idaho 911, 914, 828 P.2d 1316, 1319 (1992). "The information, 
indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was committed within the State of Idaho 
confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the court." State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 
228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 (2004). An invalid charging document does not confer 
subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840-41, 252 P.3d 1255, 
1258-1259 (2011). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a charging indictment is 
jurisdictionally invalid where the defendant was acquitted of the charged offense at 
trial and the district court allowed a post-acquittal amendment to a non-included 
offense. State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 526-527, 261 P.3d 519, 520-521 (2011) ("To 
allow a prosecutor to amend an indictment to charge an offense other than that for 
12 
which the defendant was held to answer would permit the prosecutor to, in essence, 
become the grand jury."). Thus, the jury's acquittal on the only valid charge against 
Flegel ended the district court's jurisdiction over the case. kL 
More recently, in an opinion which is now pending review by the Idaho 
Supreme Court, the Idaho Court of Appeals applied Flegel more broadly, holding that 
a pretrial amendment to a non-included offense rendered the charging indictment 
jurisdictionally invalid even where the defendant pied guilty to the new charge, and 
even where there was no intervening trial acquittal of the original charge. State v. 
Schmeirer, Idaho_, P.3d _, 2014 WL 6652924 (Ct. App. 2014), petition 
for review granted. Flegel does not control the outcome in this case, and the state 
asserts that Schmeirer was wrongly decided. 
In this case, Pridgen waived his right to a preliminary hearing on the felony 
stalking charge by pleading guilty to that charge. It is well-settled that a valid plea of 
guilty, voluntarily and understandingly given, waives all non-jurisdictional defects and 
defenses, whether constitutional or statutory, in prior proceedings. State v. Dunlap, 
123 Idaho 396, 399, 848 P.2d 454, 457 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Fowler, 105 Idaho 
642,643,671 P.2d 1105, 1106 (Ct. App. 1983). 
In Fowler, the defendant asked the court to overturn his conviction because of 
a defect in the preliminary hearing process. Fowler asserted that "the magistrate 
committed prejudicial error in letting the state amend the complaint against him - to 
include the restaurant burglary charge - during the course of the preliminary 
hearing." Fowler, 105 Idaho at 643, 671 P.2d at 1106. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
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concluded that Fowler waived his right challenge the probable cause 
determination regarding the added charge once he pied guilty: 
[W]e hold that Fowler's plea of guilty to that new charge waived his right to 
contest the preliminary hearing procedure. The purpose of a preliminary 
hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause to require the 
accused to stand trial. It is well settled that a valid plea of guilty, voluntarily 
and understandingly given, waives all non-jurisdictional defects and 
defenses, whether constitutional or statutory, in prior proceedings. Here 
Fowler does not attack the entry and acceptance of his plea. His plea of 
guilty to the restaurant burglary therefore constituted a waiver of the 
procedure to determine probable cause, just as if he had waived the 
preliminary hearing itself, on that charge. 
Fowler, 105 Idaho at 643, 671 P.2d at 1106 (emphasis added, internal citations 
omitted). 
Likewise, in this case, Pridgen's plea of guilty to the felony stalking charge 
constituted a waiver of the procedure to determine probable cause, just as if he had 
expressly waived the preliminary hearing itself. Further, unlike in Flegel, there was 
no intervening acquittal which ended the district court's jurisdiction over the charging 
information. Therefore, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to accept 
Pridgen's plea to the felony stalking charge. 
Pridgen has failed to demonstrate that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
accept his guilty plea to felony stalking. This Court should therefore affirm Pridgen's 
judgment of conviction. 
111. 
Pridgen Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying Pridgen's Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
14 
Introduction 
Pridgen contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, pp.20-28.) A review of the 
record reveals that Pridgen has failed to establish either that his plea was 
constitutionally invalid, or there was any other just reason for the withdrawal of his 
plea. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from 
arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 775, 780-
781 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 P.2d 330, 
334 (Ct. App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's factual findings 
if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 
159, 161, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 256, 869 
P.2d 571, 573 (Ct. App. 1994 ). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion To Deny Pridgen's Motion 
To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be made before sentence is imposed. 
I.C.R. 33(c). The presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic right, 
however. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990); 
Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780. The defendant bears the burden of 
proving, in the district court, that the plea should be withdrawn. Hanslovan, 147 
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Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780; Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 374-375, 825 P.2d 94, 
App. 1992). 
In ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the court must determine, as a 
threshold matter, whether the plea was entered knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781; State v. Rodriguez, 118 
Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990). As a matter of constitutional 
due process, a plea is knowing and voluntary if it is "entered by one fully aware of 
the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to 
him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 
742, 755 (1970). If the plea was voluntary, in the constitutional sense, then the court 
must determine whether other just cause exists to allow the defendant to withdraw 
the plea. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536,211 P.3d at 781. The good faith, credibility, 
and weight of the defendant's assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his 
plea are matters for the trial court to decide. kl at 537, 211 P.3d at 782. 
A district court may also consider prejudice to the state in determining 
whether to permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. State v. Henderson, 113 
Idaho 411, 414, 744 P.2d 795, 798 (Ct. App. 1987); see also Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 
at 536, 211 P.3d at 781 ("Once the defendant has met this burden [of showing just 
cause], the state may avoid withdrawal of the plea by demonstrating the existence of 
prejudice." 
After his guilty plea, but prior to sentencing, Pridgen filed a motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea. (R., pp.178-179.) Pridgen asserted: (1) his plea was involuntary 
16 
he did not understand the terms the plea agreement; and was 
crime. (Id.) 
At the hearing on his motion, Pridgen testified that his prior appointed counsel 
did not timely provide him with discovery, and that when he did eventually receive it, 
he learned that the allegations being made against him were not true. (8/13/14 Tr., 
p.6, L.23 - p.8, L.24.) However, Pridgen also acknowledged that he received 
discovery by April 2014, two months before he pied guilty in June 2014. (8/13/14 Tr., 
p.8, Ls.17-24.) Pridgen also testified that he didn't understand the plea agreement 
and that at the time he entered the plea he was "being pushed in a direction that [he] 
didn't want to go [by] a previous attorney." (8/13/14 Tr., p.6, L.22 - p.7, L.7.) 
However, Pridgen also acknowledged that this "previous attorney," Christopher 
Schwartz, was no longer representing him at the time he entered his guilty plea. 
(8/13/14 Tr., p.12, L.19 - p.13, L.8.) After the state elicited this information on cross-
examination, Pridgen set forth a different argument - that his new counsel, Tyler 
Wirick, was not prepared for trial. (8/13/14 Tr., p.13, L.1 -p.14, L.4.) Pridgen further 
testified that Wirick did not explain to him the nature of the charges against him, or 
inform him of the rights he would waive by pleading guilty. (8/13/14 Tr., p.16, L.9 -
p.17, L.12.) Finally, Pridgen testified that during the change of plea hearing, he did 
not understand the district court's explanation of his rights or of the charges against 
him. (8/13/14 Tr., p.18, L.2-p.19, L.3.) 
The state opposed Pridgen's motion, and asserted that it would suffer 
prejudice should the court permit Pridgen to withdraw his plea. (8/13/14 Tr., p.30, 
Ls.6-15.) Specifically, the state represented to the court that Pridgen "effectively 
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terrified the victim," that the victim had moved out of state and was reluctant 
cooperate with the prosecution, and that the state may not be able to go forward 
should Pridgen be permitted to withdraw his plea. (Id.) 
The district court denied Pridgen's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., 
pp.191-192; 8/13/14 Tr., p.31, L. 19 - p.35, L.9.) The court first concluded that 
Pridgen's testimony at the hearing was "calculated" and "evasive." (8/13/14 Tr., 
p.32, Ls.5-9.) This credibility determination cannot be disturbed on appeal. 
Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537, 211 P.3d at 782. The district court further concluded 
that the colloquy conducted at the change of plea hearing adequately informed 
Pridgen of his relevant rights and of the nature of the plea agreement. (8/13/14 Tr., 
p.32, L.16 - p.33, L.23.) Finally, the court concluded that at the change of plea 
hearing, Pridgen indicated that he understood the charges against him and the 
nature of the plea agreement. (8/13/14 Tr., p.33, L.24 - p.34, L.23.) 
A review of the transcript of the change of plea hearing colloquy supports the 
conclusions of the district court. (6/3/14 Tr., p.7, L.14 - p.15, L.11.) Pridgen 
specifically testified that that his attorney's recitation of the plea agreement reflected 
his understanding of the agreement, that he understood the rights explained to him 
by the court, that he did not need to speak further with his attorney about those 
rights, that he was not under any treatment for any mental illness, and that he was 
not taking any medications that would affect his ability to make a voluntary decision 
to plead guilty. (Id.) Finally, the court specifically informed Pridgen that he would not 
be able to withdraw his guilty plea after he entered it. (6/3/14 Tr., p.9, L.25 - p.10, 
L.1.) Pridgen cannot show that the district court abused its discretion. 
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On appeal, Pridgen also asserts that his plea agreement was unenforceable 
because it was not subject to valid consideration. (Appellant's brief, pp.26-28.) 
Specifically, Pridgen, relying on his arguments with respect to the court's jurisdiction 
over the third amended charging information (see Section II, supra), contends that 
the state could not have lawfully fulfilled its promise to amend Pridgen's charge for 
felony battery with the intent to commit a serious felony to the charge of felony 
stalking. (Id; citing State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595, 226 P.3d 535, 537 
(2010)). Pridgen's argument fails because, as discussed above, the district court 
had jurisdiction to accept Pridgen's plea to the amended charge. 
Pridgen has failed to demonstrate either that his plea was constitutionally 
invalid, or that there exists other "just cause" for the withdrawal of his plea. He has 
also failed to demonstrate that the district court acted arbitrarily, as opposed to 
exercising sound judicial judgment, in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. He 
has therefore failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of 
conviction entered upon Pridgen's guilty plea to felony stalking. 
DATED this 29th day of September, 2015. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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